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In Madness, Distress and the Politics of Disablement, editors Helen Spandler, Jill Anderson and Bob Sapey
bring together contributors to explore the challenges of applying theories and policies of disability to understandings
of madness and distress. With a number of essays drawing on close engagement with lived experience, this is a
rewarding and frequently compelling read that does not shy away from grappling with the uncertainties surrounding
its field of inquiry, finds Peter Barham. 
Madness, Distress and the Politics of Disablement. Helen Spandler, Jill Anderson and Bob Sapey (eds).
Policy Press. 2015.  
Find this book: 
Since the early 1990s, mental health problems have been in the
ascendant, fast closing the gap on physical disabilities as the most
common reason why people in the UK claim welfare payments such
as incapacity benefit.  As the editors of this stimulating and wide-
ranging collection acknowledge, indubitably this indicates ‘a growing
mental health constituency who might be considered chronically ill or
“disabled”’ (2). So can we infer from this that madness or distress are
correctly framed as forms of disability?  Alas, this is where the going
gets tricky for there is no straightforward answer to this question. It is
therefore the burden of the book to explore ‘the unsettled relationship
between madness and disability’, the ‘implications of the distress
and/or disability conundrum for people with mental health problems’
(1) and to demonstrate that the connections between
madness/distress and disability are far from incontrovertible.
Though policy and legislation have mostly favoured the assimilation
of mental health into a disability framework, frequently they have
ridden roughshod over some of the complexities involved here, not
least the reluctance of many people who experience madness or
distress to identify as disabled. These issues reflect controversies
between and also within disability studies and critical approaches to
mental health (or what are sometimes known as ‘mad studies’), and
also between the disabled people’s movement and the mental health
service user/survivor movement, all of which have mostly developed in parallel, having at one and the same time an
awful lot in common but also surprisingly little to do with each other.
Disability activists and theorists disagree about many things, but even where they adopt a social constructionist
approach, they do not for the most part dispute the existence and reality of impairments. The mental health field is
far more controverted, however, and there is no consensus over the nature of any underlying mental impairment, or
indeed over whether any such impairment exists.  As the editors are aware, this whole terrain is a definitional
nightmare. Though by and large they adopt the vocabulary of ‘madness’ and ‘distress’ to distance themselves from
the medicalising consequences of ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental disorder’ – and also from ‘mental health’, which is
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frequently used as a euphemism for its opposite – these are really only provisional moves in an unfolding political
process and there is no one term, or set of terms, that is wholly satisfactory.
The book examines these considerations from a range of different vantage points in twenty chapters by contributors
from diverse backgrounds, quite a number with lived experience of mental health issues. These are without
exception well-argued and presented,  but the book is perhaps at its most compelling when it takes us into close,
brave and sometimes surprising explorations of this uncertain terrain.
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Two young academics with lived experience of psychosis, Nev Jones and Timothy Kelly, proceed from their own
‘complicated and often confusing personal experience of psychosis’ to draw attention to the heterogeneities of
madness and their relationship to disability. ‘If there is a point in the lives of activists when they feel a relative sense
of certainty and stability in the way they view the politics of their movement(s)’, they write, ‘we have not yet reached
it. In this sense, our theoretical hesitations undoubtedly reflect a more personal feeling of caution and uncertainty’
(43). They comment on questionable practices of representational overreach in the survivor movement, whereby a
continued need for care by some survivors in the face of ongoing impairment may often be framed as deviance by
some anti-psychiatric activists. A stress on heterogeneity does, of course, run the risk of reifying rather questionable
traditional psychiatric categories, but it possesses the not inconsiderable merit of drawing attention to complications
and absences in some of the more jaunty celebrations of the survivor movement.
The author of a foundational document ‘Distress or Disability?’, originally written for the Greater Manchester
Coalition of Disabled People in 1994, Anne Plumb asks whether mental health service users/survivors should be
subsumed within a broader disability movement. While some survivors/activists celebrate the achievements of the
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities  (CRPD), Plumb has profound misgivings, maintaining that
the premise behind CRPD that self-determination is paramount, and that people are able at all times, given the right
amount of support, to express their own wishes, is deeply flawed. She writes movingly about her own experience
here as well as that of the survivor activist Peter Campbell:
How can we instruct an advocate when we ourselves may be bewildered by what is happening,
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especially if we have not encountered such an experience before? […] In hindsight, I may know what
I do not want (for example, removal to a psychiatric ward, psychiatric medication or some forms of
psychotherapy) […] However, at the time I was overwhelmed by confusion and indescribable despair
(no imminent heaven on earth!) (193-94).
Plumb agrees wholeheartedly that the really radical development in the survivor movement was its insistence on
‘speaking out’, but she is no less adamant in her belief that she does ‘not see this as claiming that we fully
understand our experiences’ (186).  Alert though she is to the unacceptable ways in which diverse authorities have
responded to the risks posed by people in mental distress, she provides a robust justification for intervention as
such. In her own case, for instance, she ‘very nearly stepped into a bath of boiling water in the belief that I needed to
demonstrate faith in God (aka mystics running over hot coals)’ (190). The danger with those who uncritically
embrace CRPD, Plumb claims, is that they risk running from the frying pan of traditional psychiatry into the fire of
libertarian ideology.
Another strength of this collection is that it explores an issue such as CRPD from an alternate standpoint.  Bhargavi
Davar, a survivor of psychiatry in India and a therapist, delivers an eloquent account of the lingering legacy of
colonial psychiatry and of the role of CRPD in transforming the prospects for survivors in contemporary India.  An
autistic adult and a researcher in disability studies, Steve Graby offers a spirited take on neurodiversity as a
framework that could potentially bridge the gap between the disabled people’s movement and the mental health
system survivors’ movement. But could neurodiversity accommodate all the heterogeneities of madness identified
by Jones and Kelly? That seems rather questionable, but there is still plenty to chew on here.
‘A pedagogy for uncertain times has itself to be uncertain’, remarks an educator in the conclusion. Uncertainty and
ambivalence are indeed the keynotes of this book. There is no grand theory here, nothing to put us on the ‘right’ or
‘correct’ path. Can models and policies developed to liberate disabled people, as the question is asked in the
introduction, have liberatory potential for those experiencing madness and distress?  ‘We still haven’t decided’, the
editors confide in the conclusion, ‘whether we think it is helpful to situate madness/distress within a disability
framework’. Moreover, ‘sometimes we have found ourselves thinking, or dreaming in metaphors about the “problem
of impairment” and we often felt that we were going round in circles’ (288).  For those in need of a simple take-home
message this collection is very likely to disappoint, but for those who are willing to wrestle with paradoxes and
contradictions, it constitutes a very considerable and rewarding resource whose strength may lie precisely in its
uncertainties, in its resolute refusal to permit itself to be classified as yet another critique of the medical model,
instead feeling its way towards alternative understandings not through ideologies dropped from on high, but through
close engagement with lived experience.
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